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Abstract
Empirical evidence on the productive efficiency of non-profit
organisations is at present scarce and not conclusive. In the
present work, we analyse this issue by relying on a new data-set
about Italian for-profit and non-profit organisations engaged in the
provision of communal services. While most of the existing
evidence relates to health-care organisations only, our data-set
also surveys organisations involved in other communal services.
The results indicate that the efficiency of non-profit organisations
does not significantly differ from that of other organisations, and
shed some light about the determination of their performance. The
selection procedures adopted in hiring labour are found to be very
relevant. We also find that the production of relational goods
(measured by two different proxies) is related to organisational
efficiency and to the promotion efforts of non-profit organisations.
JEL classification: L31, D23, J41.
* We are grateful to Carlo Borzaga for providing us with our data,
to Sara Depedri for providing us some extra information about the
data, and to Giuseppina Autiero for comments received during the
writing of the present paper.3
1. Introduction
From the 1980s, the non-profit sector has acquired a very
respectable size in advanced market economies, until reaching, in
terms of share of the GDP, a weight even greater than the
agricultural sector (see Salamon et al., 1999). Indeed, as an
economy develops itself, consumer demand increasingly directs
itself toward immaterial goods, including communal services.
Besides, there has been a pervasive crisis of the welfare state,
making it more difficult for consumers to obtain such services
through this channel. Hence the public sector has found more and
more convenient to tender their provision to non-profit
organisations. But then, the need of greater cost-efficiency and
transparency of expenditure decisions that has inspired in many
countries studies of the efficiency of the public sector rebounds
over these non-profit organisations, which should be selected on
the basis of the same criteria (Barbetta, 1997). This explains why
the evaluation of productive efficiency for non-profit organisations
is becoming a high policy priority (Angeloni and Fiorentini, 1997;
Andreaus, 1997).
There are still difficulties in considering non-profit organisations
as economic agents (not only social or political ones), that is as
producers of either relational or merit goods, especially because
they rely on the gratuitous productive services supplied by
members and volunteers. But these organisations also utilise
public funding and donors’ money to acquire such scarce
resources as paid labour, capital, energy and material inputs.
Furthermore, in any given organisation, volunteer labour must
have an opportunity cost in terms of the services that might have
been provided to the public in another organisation. More
fundamentally, berating the merits of efficiency analysis within the
non-profit sector seems to imply that, not moving within the sphere
of market transactions, the members of these organisations should
disregard the result of the their own effort (also meant in the
financial sense). But the history of the non-profit sector in most
countries indicates that great attention has always been paid to the
effects of the organisations’ action.4
Also, a new study of the productive efficiency of non-profit
organisations should prove rather useful from the analytical
standpoint. According to Hansmann (1996), the fact that non-profit
organisations lack stakeholders interested in the appropriation of
residual surplus could lead to an attenuation of property rights and,
hence, to a reduction of productive efficiency (the motives
highlighted by Leibenstein’s, 1966, famous analysis of X-efficiency
are here highly relevant). Yet, the (few) empirical works on this
topic, which have dealt with organisations engaged in the provision
of health services, do not show any significant difference in the
cost efficiency of non-profit, versus for-profit, organisations
(Preston, 1988; Hansmann, 1996, pp. 238-240). As pointed out in
Turati (2001), this outcome could arise because, even if property
rights are attenuated, managers (and workers) in the non-profit
sector are highly interested in their reputation. The importance of a
strict ethical code in the non-profit sector could then successfully
counterbalance the lack of a class of stakeholders interested in the
appropriation of residual surplus.
In any case, more empirical evidence seems to be needed on
this matter for the following reasons. First of all, while the objective
function of for-profit firms is almost invariably given by some form
of profit maximisation, the objective function of non-profit
organisations is less clear-cut and very often multi-dimensional.
This not only makes more complicated the assessment work of the
stakeholders (Hansmann, 1996, p. 239), but also potentially biases
the empirical measurement of efficiency. As was highlighted by
Pestieau and Tulkens (1993) in their study of the appropriateness
of efficiency analysis for the public sector, it appears that the only
concept immune from these potential biases is that of technical
efficiency, fundamentally based on the comparison between
physical resources engaged and results obtained. On the other
hand, the above quoted studies focus on cost efficiency and are
potentially affected from this measurement bias.
1
                                                
1 In the literature it is customarily assumed that this bias arises because the multi-
dimensional objective function of non-profit organisations might include some redistributive
purposes, leading to higher unit costs. But, the contrary could also be true; in particular it is
sometimes maintained that non-profit organisations are viable only because of their
recourse to underpaid labour.5
In at least one case (Callen, 1994), measures of technical
efficiency have already been provided for non-profit organisations.
Interestingly, Callen (1994) introduces these measures in a model
of donations to non-profit institutions
2 as an explanatory variable of
the amount of donations received. Ex-ante, non-profit
organisations are supposed to compete one with the other to
attract donors’ funds, even promoting their own image. Ex-post,
they are assessed by the donors that can discontinue their funding
if they deem as unsatisfactory the performance of the organisation
they have chosen. In fact Callen (1994) finds that a measure of
technical efficiency (among other more customary variables)
affects significantly the amount of donors’ money received in a
sample of Canadian organisations. Our effort differs from Callen
(1994) because in his paper the type of organisations analysed
(fund-raising charities) makes it easier to define the output of these
organisations: the amounts of funds raised. It could also be argued
that the positive correlation between efficiency and donations is
spuriously engendered by this definition of output. We attempt to
measure efficiency in the provision of communal services, which
we take to be a more representative case of the kind of action in
which non-profit institutions are usually engaged.
Also, note that most of the existing evidence on the efficiency of
non-profit organisations relates to health-care organisations only.
But, from the analytical and the policy standpoints it would be
interesting to gather some evidence about non-profit organisations
involved in the provision of other types of communal services. Our
data-set allows us this kind of assessment. As will be seen below,
it includes organisations involved in the provision of a wide array of
services (to be sure comprising health-care services).
Indeed, a distinguishing feature of the present work is that we
rely on a new data-set about Italian for-profit organisations, non-
profit organisations and public institutions engaged in the provision
of communal services (Borzaga, 2000). This data-set is particularly
interesting because it surveys organisations involved in a wide
range of communal services, and because of its wealth of
                                                
2 The loci classici of this literature are probably Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986), Posnett
and Sandler (1989).6
qualitative and quantitative information on these organisations. We
believe this information makes our effort interesting both from the
analytical and from the policy standpoint. Through our analysis, it
will be possible to provide some indications of the impact of some
structural characteristics of the organisations (localisation,
organisational structure, and so on) on the technical efficiency of
these institutions. This data-set has also some drawbacks,
particularly as far as its size is concerned, and below we deal with
the methodological aspects of estimating technical efficiency in
these conditions.
Another distinguishing feature of our work is that some attention
is devoted (in Section 2) to the definition of the production set of a
non-profit organisation. This analysis is needed to make sense of a
comparison between for-profit and non-profit organisations. For the
latter the distinction between input and output is not always clear a
priori. For instance, the acquisition of new donors and volunteers
widens the input or the output set of a non-profit organisation?
Certainly, these are resources allowing them to provide more
services, and hence should be considered as inputs. Yet, it could
also be said that the diffusion of the organisations' values
throughout society is for them a relevant result of their action. To
answer a question like this we need a model of this organisation,
defining its objective function, its resources and the results of its
actions. Our model, whose crucial feature is the relationship
between the production of communal services and of relational
goods, allows us to define technical and organisational efficiency
of the non-profit organisation, as well as to single out their
determinants.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. In Section 3
we present our data set in greater detail, illustrating in particular
our input and output measures. Another fundamental
methodological point is the choice of the estimation procedure.
This choice turns out to be greatly dependent on the nature of the
input and output data. In Section 4 we argue that the nature of our
data-set and our interest in the explanation of technical efficiency
suggest to adopt a parametric frontier approach. Some emphasis
is given to the procedures used for outlier search. In Section 5 we
present the determinants of technical efficiency, distinguishing
between those related to the environment and those related to the7
internal structure of the organisations, that is to organisational
efficiency. We also define some proxies for the relational goods
provided by non-profit organisations. In Section 6 the results are
given and commented, while some concluding remarks are offered
in Section 7.
2. A simple model of the non-profit organisation
In order to propose a model of the non-profit organisation, we
first need to define this kind of institution. By non-profit
organisations we mean those institutions characterised by the non-
distribution of profits and by the large presence of volunteer
workers among its members. Moreover, non-profit organisations
provide services, usually some kind of merit good, to the public not
necessarily in exchange for a monetary counterpart (this has
obvious implications for the measurement of output, which will be
taken up in Section 3); correspondingly they obtain part of the
resources needed for their survival from public funding and from
private donations. Finally, an influential body of works (see for
instance Gui, 2000, and the references therein) argues that the
output of non-profit organisations does not simply amount to the
merit goods they distribute, but includes the relational goods
produced in this manner. By this term, the literature means the
feelings of trust and reciprocity (in sociological parlance, the
networks of trust) originated by the action of the non-profit
organisation.
Naturally, there is no contradiction between the provision of
merit goods and the production of relational goods. Rather, it is the
case that the former fosters and sustains the latter. Gratuity is
related to the motivations of the organisation members (altruism,
self-satisfaction, self-interest,…) and not to the disregard toward
the results of the organisation’s action. See for instance what is
said by a practitioner about this: “…the issue of the gift relates
more to the volunteer worker and his/her motivations than to the
recipient of the volunteer action: the latter is above all interested8
that the service he/she needs be of good quality and given in such
a way as to respect his/her dignity, in other words he/she expects
a good service, rather than a good gift [our translation]”.
3 This
“good service”, however, is not simply an end in itself, but also a
token given in an exchange where the real aim for the organisation
is the creation of a network of trust between the organisation and
the people it assists.
We believe it is useful to give to these ideas a formal content
(albeit an elementary one). Let us write:
(2.1) R  =  f ( M ; P ; F ; W ; e )
where R is the (quantity of) relational good, M is the (quantity of)
merit good, P is the (quantity of) effort of promoting the values of
the organisation, F is a vector listing the individual characteristics
of the organisation, W is a vector gathering some environmental
factors, and e is a random element. The idea contained in (2.1) is
that the organisation can produce relational goods both by
providing to the public a merit good (a token given in an exchange
whose real aim is the creation of a network of trust between the
organisation and the people it assists), and by promoting among
the public the founding values of the organisation. The success of
the organisation also depends on some environmental factors
(determining the responsiveness of the public) and on the
individual characteristics of the organisation (its intrinsic capability
of building a network of trust).
                                                
3 Nervo (1999), p. 7. “… la questione del dono riguarda più il volontario e le sue
motivazioni che il beneficiario dell’azione volontaria: a questi interessa soprattutto
che la prestazione di cui ha bisogno sia di buona qualità e sia data in modo che
rispetti la sua dignità; si aspetta cioè un buon servizio, più che un buon dono.”9
On the other hand, the production of M and P can be
represented by:
(2.2) M  =  g ( X ; TE ; e )
(2.3) P  =  h ( X ; TE ; e )
In (2.2) and (2.3), M and P are a function of a set of input
quantities, X, of the technical efficiency of the decision-making
unit, TE, and of a random factor, e. Provided that one has
measures for M, P and X, it is possible to construct from (2.2) and
(2.3) a multi-output multi-input distance function, to which frontier
analysis can be applied in order to measure the technical
efficiency of the organisations, that is their capability to obtain the
maximum amount of outputs for given inputs, or to use the
minimum amount of inputs for given outputs.
As explained in Fried et al. (1999), measures of technical
efficiency usually conflate the role of organisational efficiency
(dependent on the actions of the organisation) with that of some
structural characteristics of the organisation unrelated to its
behaviour. If one has data about these characteristics, frontier
analysis allows one to isolate the role of organisational efficiency
proper. Consequently, (2.2') and (2.3') can be rewritten as:10
(2.2') M  =  g ( X ; S ; OE ; e )
(2.3') P  =  h ( X ; S ; OE ; e )
In (2.2') and (2.3'), M and P are a function of a set of input
quantities, X, of a vector of structural characteristics, S, of the
organisational efficiency of the decision-making unit, OE, and of a
random factor, e.
Note that the capability of an organisation of building a
network of trust crucially depends on the effort and
resourcefulness shown to the public, which surely must be
included among the components of vector F. But both these
factors must equally be included among the determinants of
organisational efficiency. In the absence of more direct indicators
of effort and resourcefulness, some measure of organisational
efficiency is then likely to be included among the components of
vector F. Hence, given the above model, non-profit organisations
care about their organisational efficiency, because their ultimate
aim (the production of relational goods) is best achieved if they
maximise their production of M and P for given resources, and
because, for given M and P, higher organisational efficiency is
likely to be associated with the production of more relational
goods.
In accordance with the above presented model, our empirical
analysis will begin with the measurement of technical efficiency
and the assessment of the relationship between technical
efficiency and the S variables; from this we should obtain a
measure of organisational efficiency. Then, we will attempt to
estimate an empirical counterpart of (2.1). Particular attention will
be paid to the possibility that the vector F contains a measure of
organisational efficiency.11
3. The data set
3.a) The Borzaga (2000) Survey
The data-set utilised in the present work, and described in
greater detail in Borzaga (2000), relates to a sample of 228 Italian
organisations involved in the provision of communal services. The
sample includes 268 operating units (31 organisations have 2 or 3
operating units). In the empirical work we will concentrate on the
operating units (OU’s), because they are more numerous and
contain more disaggregate information. For organisational
reasons, data could be gathered only in 10 North-Centre provinces
(provincia, a territorial administrative unit roughly corresponding in
population and scale to a British county, or a French département)
and in 5 Southern provinces.
4 This choice is, at least to some
extent, compatible with the requirement of yielding information
about units belonging to different areas of the country. The choice
of the organisations to be interviewed in every one of these
provinces was preceded by the reconstruction of the population of
organisations providing some communal services (old people care,
health care, education, cultural animation, recreation, social
assistance, job-search assistance, others) and belonging to
different institutional categories (public administration, for-profit,
non-profit). It is then believed that the data-set offers a sufficiently
accurate image of the population as far as territorial distribution,
type of service provided and institutional category are concerned.
As can be seen from Table 3.1, the majority of OU’s in the
sample belong to non-profit organisations, while not very many of
them belong to for-profit organisations (the latter are concentrated
in the provision of health care). Other important features of the
sampled OU’s are that most of them are of small size and operate
at the local level. Furthermore, most of them provide more than
                                                
4 The 10 North-Centre provinces are Cuneo, Torino, Brescia, Trento, Venezia,
Gorizia, Pordenone, Trieste, Udine, Firenze. The 5 Southern provinces are
Napoli, Salerno, Catanzaro, Reggio Calabria, Messina.12
one type of service. Paid workers are evenly distributed across
OU’s belonging to different categories. On the other hand, non-
paid labour mostly belongs to non-profit organisations (93% of
religious non-profit organisations, 71% of non-religious non-profit
organisations, 61% of social cooperatives have non-paid workers),
but is also present in public administration (40% of the OU’s
belonging to public administration have non-paid workers, basically
conscientious objectors).
3.b) The Production Set
The definition of inputs and outputs for the OU’s under
examination can take advantage from the existence of a sizeable
literature about the efficiency of public and private services. Given
the nature of many of the OU’s, particularly useful is the literature
about health-related institutions (see for instance Burgess and
Wilson, 1993). Following the considerations made in the preceding
section, we need to single out measures for M (the quantity of
merit good), for P (the promotion effort), and for the input
quantities included in vector X. We leave to Section 5 the
measurement of the structural characteristics included in vector S
and of the relational good R.
Surely, the easier task is to define and measure the key inputs
included in vector X. The efficiency analysis of public and private
services suggests that, in order to produce M, the followings inputs
are usually relevant:
a) labour;
b) other variable inputs (fuel, …);
c) physical capital (buildings, beds, means of transportation, ...).
Our data provide some quantitative information for all these
variables, but, as can be seen from Table 3.2, the response rates
for some of these measures are very low. The data about labour
allow the researcher to distinguish among male and female, full-
time and part-time, paid and non-paid labour. The latter can be13
disaggregated in volunteers (which operate in the OU gratuitously
and continuously), conscientious objectors (which have opted out
of the army draft system, choosing instead to spend their draft
period in social service), and other operators (basically, members
of the OU, which do not operate in it continuously). Furthermore,
there are data about the standard weekly number of hours
provided by either paid or non-paid labour. The last measures,
which implicitly account for the presence of part-time workers and
for the time-effort offered by volunteer workers, seem to be in
principle the most appropriate ones. In practice, we shall use the
number of paid and non-paid workers, which are available for a
higher number of OU’s and in preliminary work were found to give
much the same results as standard weekly hours.
Other variable inputs can be measured through the non-
personnel current expenditures of the OU. Obviously, this is a
good measure only under the assumption that all OU’s pay the
same prices for these inputs and buy the same basket of
intermediate goods. This is a commonly made hypothesis, but the
real problem in our case is the extremely high number of non-
available values for this variable.
The problem of a low response rate is also present to some
extent for the measures of physical capital. While the response
rate is high for the number of beds (a very important input for the
OU’s that provide old people and health care), the number of
missing values is considerably large for another potentially
important measure, the surface of buildings. The response rate is
more satisfactory for the number of cars and the number of
computers, but it can be thought a priori that these are less
important inputs.
There is more difficulty in finding good measures for the OU’s
outputs, M and P. For most OU’s, monetary measures of output do
not make much sense, as services are not always provided within
market transactions. From the efficiency analysis of health-related
institutions one can derive quantitative proxies of M, such as the
number of persons reached and/or treated. We take the number of
service users, even if its response rate is a bit too low for comfort.
It would be desirable to have a more precise measure, allowing for
the fact that different services have different input requirements,14
but such a correction (similar to that performed through Diagnosis
Related Groups in health economics) cannot be performed on our
data. Finally, our data-set does not contain any quantitative proxy
for P. However, there is a categorical proxy (with a very high
response rate), a variable taking values 1, 2, 3 if the Care of Users
/ Promotion of Organisation Values is non-existent, provided
occasionally, provided systematically. To some extent, this proxy is
also related to the quality of the services provided by the OU. The
categorical nature of this variable prevents the specification of a
multi-output distance function along the lines suggested in Coelli
and Perelman (1999). In Section 4, however, we will suggest how
we can still profit from this piece of information.
3.c) The Sectors under Examination
Perhaps of paramount importance among the prerequisites of
efficiency measurement is the comparability of the units being
examine, which must have sufficiently similar technology, input
and output composition. This requirement is certainly relevant
here, as OU’s may provide widely different mixes of communal
services. Efficiency is to be measured across OU’s characterised
by a sufficiently similar service-mix, keeping in mind that the
number of observations for our data-set is relatively low. This
means that our sample can be partitioned in two, at most three,
more homogeneous sub-groups.
To ascertain the kind of partition that we apply to our sample,
we consider various sets of Spearman’s rank correlations,
exploring the associations between different characteristics of the
OU’s. First of all, in Table 3.3, we consider the correlations among
binary indicators for the presence of a given type of service. As in
the following Tables, we highlight relatively high correlations. This
exercise suggests the existence of two clusters: one the one hand
the OU’s that provide old people care tend to provide health care
too. On the other hand, there is positive correlation between
education, cultural animation, recreation, social assistance, and, to15
a lesser extent, between social assistance and the residual sector,
others. To gain further insight about these service groups, we
consider the correlations between the numbers of users per OU for
the following 14 groups of users: old people, physically
handicapped, drug addicts, AIDS sufferers, alcoholics, mental
illnesses, children, risk areas, young people, immigrants/homeless,
detainees and former detainees, family problems, female condition
problems, others. From the correlations shown in Table 3.4, we
proceed to aggregate these groups, creating clusters that have
negative or zero correlation among themselves: old people,
physically handicapped; children; drug addicts + AIDS sufferers +
alcoholics + mental illnesses + detainees and former detainees +
others; risk areas + young people + immigrants/homeless + family
problems + female condition problems. Then, in Table 3.5, we
assess the correlation between these clusters and the service
groups.
The picture from Table 3.5 is rather clear-cut: the old people
care and health-care binary indicators are associated with large
numbers of users from the old people group. The indicators for
education, cultural animation, social assistance, others, and, to a
lesser extent, recreation are associated with large numbers of
users from risk areas + young people + immigrants/homeless +
family problems + female condition problems. The indicator for job-
search assistance is associated with large numbers of users from
drug addicts + AIDS sufferers + alcoholics + mental illnesses +
detainees and former detainees + others, and, to a lesser extent,
physically handicapped. This strengthens the impression of two
service clusters: old people care + health care; education + cultural
animation + recreation + social assistance + others; job-search
assistance remaining something of a standalone.
In Table 3.6 we consider the correlation among service group
indicators and a binary indicator for the provision of residential
services. Much the same clusters found before are revealed by
these correlations. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 prove the importance of
distinguishing between residential and non-residential services as
far as the input mix is concerned. Both a binary indicator for the
presence of beds and the number of beds itself are very highly
correlated with the provision of residential services. Actually, all
important inputs are positively correlated with the provision of16
residential services, but the input-mix in these services appears to
be very strongly tilted in favour of beds.
All the above evidence suggests the following sample partition
(wholly based on information contained in the data-set):
A) all OU’s that provide old people and health care, and that
have non-zero beds among their inputs;
B) all OU’s that provide education, cultural animation,
recreation, social assistance, others, and that do not have beds
among their inputs;
C) all OU’s that mainly provide job-search assistance.
While the latter group is rather small (20 OU’s) and cannot be
used for estimation, the other two groups are sufficiently large
even when allowance is made for some missing values. The two
groups consist of 84 and 98 observations in a baseline production
set with number of users and the categorical variable for Care of
Users / Promotion of Organisation Values as outputs; paid and
non-paid labour, plus eventually beds, as inputs. We will base our
analysis on these two sectors, henceforward denoted as A and B.
We exclude from the input set non-personnel current expenditures
and the surface of buildings because their high number of missing
values severely reduces the degrees of freedom available and is
detrimental to the respect of the original sample design. It is
perhaps not inappropriate to point out at this stage that these
variables have been included in our preferred estimates and not
found significant.
4. The empirical procedure
The nature of the data, especially as regards the size of the
sample, was of great importance in determining the structure of the
empirical analysis. Recent studies (Park et al., 1997; Kneip et al.,
1998; Gijbels et al., 1999) have shown that a major problem of
small-sample bias arises in non-parametric frontier approaches
(both DEA and FDH). Also, our interest in the explanation of
efficiency means that our baseline production set must be17
augmented with potential determinants of efficiency, leading to an
even fiercer degrees-of-freedom constraint. For these reasons, we
adopt a parametric frontier approach.
There are two ways to assess the role of potential determinants
of efficiency within the parametric approach. We could estimate a
production function, obtain the efficiency scores, and regress them
on the S variables. Alongside with the S variables, one could also
include regressors that are direct proxies of organisational
efficiency (for the sake of exposition, we gather the latter in a
vector O). However, these two-stage estimates are at least
inefficient, and possibly inconsistent if the S’s and the O’s are
correlated with the inputs; hence the appropriateness of a one-
stage procedure. In the present work we first experimented the ML
procedure proposed in Battese and Coelli (1995), that
straightforwardly allows to incorporate the explanation of
inefficiency uit in the estimation of the production function.
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas function:
(4.1) yi  =  xi b b + (vi – ui)
where yi is the natural log of the production of producer i; xi is a
vector of (natural logs of the) input quantities of producer i; b b is a
vector of coefficients. Also, assume that vi ~ iid N v ( , ) 0
2 s ,
independently distributed with respect to the ui, non-negative
random variables which stand for technical inefficiency and are
determined by:
(4.2) ui  =  zi d d + wi
where zi is a vector of determinants of efficiency of producer i; d d is
a vector of coefficients, and wit ~ id N v ( , ) 0
2 s  are random variables
obtained truncating a normal distribution with zero mean so as to18
make ui non-negative: the truncation point is equal to -zid d so that
wi³-zi d d. It is not necessary to assume that the wi are either
identically distributed or non-negative. The z vector includes all the
variables that explain the difference between yi and xi b b + vi.
Parameters b b and d d are estimated simultaneously and the
technical efficiency of producer i at time t is defined by:
(4.3) TEi  = exp {-ui} = exp{-zi d d - wi}
Naturally, in our case the z vector should include both the S
and the O variables:
(4.3’) TEi  = exp {-ui} = exp{-Si d d1 - Oi d d2 - wi}
A measure of organisational efficiency can then be retrieved
from the linear combination Oi d d2 + wi. Within this set-up it is easy
to take into account the proxy Care of Users / Promotion of
Organisation Values. Even if the categorical nature of this variable
prevents the specification of a multi-output distance function along
the lines suggested in Coelli and Perelman (1999), the proxy can
be included in the z vector. We expect it to be negatively
correlated with technical efficiency in the production of yi, as Care
of Users / Promotion of Organisation Values uses up resources
otherwise devoted to that output.
However, we did not find the conditions appropriate to the
estimation of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, as the empirical
counterparts of the (4.1) kept showing highly heteroskedastic
residuals.
5 Hence, we stuck to a simpler one-stage approach,
applying OLS to:
                                                
5 We are aware that Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) propose to estimate
efficiency scores within a model with heteroskedastic errors. We do not think that
such, computationally difficult, development is necessary for the reasons pointed
out in the text. On these matters, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), pp. 271-273.19
(4.1’) yi  =  xi b b  +  g0 P  +  Si g g1  +  Oi g g2  +  ei
where ei is a (possibly heteroskedastic) zero-mean residual, g g1, g g2
are vectors of coefficients and the other terms have already been
defined (P is the promotion effort, proxied by the variable Care of
Users / Promotion of Organisation Values, and g0 is the coefficient
attached to it). Indeed, we are not very much interested in
decomposing the error terms in a stochastic and an inefficiency
component. Rather we are interested in which of the S or O
variables explain the difference between yi and xi b b + ei. This can
be straightforwardly done in an OLS set-up, provided that the
standard errors are consistently estimated. A measure of
organisational efficiency can then be obtained from the linear
combination Oi g g2 .
In any case, we do not worry about the potential endogeneity
bias existing in a production function, relying on the results by
Zellner et al. (1966), according to which consistent estimates can
be obtained, provided that the objective function of the producers
is maximised with respect to expected (rather than actual)
variables. On the other hand, we are worried that, due to the
relative novelty of data-collection for this kind of organisations, our
data may contain some outliers, that is “observations that do not fit
in the pattern of the remaining data points and are not at all typical
of the rest of the data” (Gunst and Mason, 1980). Regression
analysis provides many tools for ascertaining the existence of such
outliers. In this work we consider externally studentized residuals
and the added variable plot.
Externally studentized residuals are obtained expanding the
standard regression model in the following way:
(4.4) E (y|x, u)  =  x b b  +  u w
where u = 1 for every i-th case, and = 0 for all other observations.
The test of w = 0 can be obtained as a t-statistic with n-k-2
degrees of freedom, and is equal to the i-th externally studentized20
residual. In typical applications, outliers are not known in advance,
and they are usually searched among the largest (in absolute
value) externally studentized residuals. Hence, we need to adjust
the significance level of the test for the multiple testing inherent in
using the largest of n statistics. An upper bound on this
significance level can be obtained relying on Bonferroni inequality
and multiplying the standard n-k-2 p-value by n.
The added variable plot (AVP) is a graphical object that gives
visual information about the numerical calculation of a regressor
coefficient, providing diagnostic information on the model (finding
whether the residuals contain relevant information on the slope
estimates) and a visual assessment of the net effect of a regressor
(that is the effect of a regressor on the dependent variable keeping
all other regressors fixed). Consider the regression model
(4.5) E (y|x)  =  x b b  =  x1 b1  +  x2 b b2
The AVP for x 2 is a plot of the residuals of the OLS regression
of y on x1 against the residuals from the OLS regression of x2 on
x1, where y is the dependent (or response) variable; x is a kx1
vector of regressors; b b is a vector of unknown parameters, and we
partition the kx1 vector of regressors x in x1 with k-1 elements and
x2 with the remaining variable. The AVP for x 2 is a plot of the
residuals of the OLS regression of y on x1 against the residuals
from the OLS regression of x2 on x1. In other words, it is a
graphical representation of the partial correlation between y and
the regressor of interest x2, adjusted for the effect of the other
regressors.
Potentially influential data points are to be searched among
extreme values along the axes, that is among values far away from
the others. Dynamic identification and deletion allows a fast
evaluation of the influence of these points. In the case of a linear
regression model, an outlier search through the AVP's
corresponds to an influence analysis performed within the local
influence approach (Cook, 1986). Based on this method, the
influence of small data perturbations on the maximum likelihood21
estimate of the model is assessed. It can be shown that potentially
influential cases can be identified in the AVP for x2 as they
maximize the rate of change in the maximum likelihood estimator
of b2 with respect to an appropriate vector of weights (using a
weighted least square set-up). Finally, under normality of
residuals, case-weight perturbation contours can be drawn to
single out these observations (Cook and Weisberg, 1994).
Andrews and Pregibon (1978) have first discussed the so-called
masking problem, when influential data points lying close to each
other in the variable space mask themselves to single-observation
diagnostic tools. In order to deal with masking, the calculation of
externally studentized residuals could be carried out on subsets of
observations, but this would greatly increase its computational
burden. On the other hand, our results show that highly influential
outliers can be found even if no allowance is made for masking.
5. The determinants of technical efficiency
Through our basic production set (including two outputs - the
number of users and the proxy for the promotion effort - and three
inputs - paid labour, non-paid labour, beds) we can measure the
technical efficiency of any given organisation. Furthermore, it is
desirable for both analytical and policy reasons to discriminate the
role of organisational efficiency (dependent on the actions of the
OU) from that of some structural characteristics of the OU
unrelated to its behaviour. As already explained in the previous
section, we do this through a single-stage procedure, including
these potential determinants along with inputs in an OLS set-up,
and basing our inference on White heteroskedasticity-corrected
standard errors. Our data-bank is quite rich in qualitative
information and we can test the significance of a rather large
number of potential determinants of technical efficiency (both S
and O variables).
The list of the potential determinants of technical efficiency here
considered derives from theoretical arguments of general22
character (for instance, the impact of public intervention; Färe et
al., 1985, still provide a very valuable survey of these factors) as
well as from the literature concerning non-profit organisations (for
instance, the nature and severity of the organisation’s
stakeholders; see Turati, 2001).
Empirical proxies of the structural characteristics have been
searched among: the age of the OU; the territorial partition (North-
Centre, South) where the OU is situated; the customary duration of
the relationship with the users; the presence of training activities,
the size of the area served; the number of different services
provided, the presence of other OU’s in the same organisation.
Among the potential determinants of organisational efficiency we
include first of all a set of binary variables allowing for the
institutional nature of the OU (public administration, for-profit,
social cooperative, religious non-profit, non-religious non-profit).
The role of public intervention was represented by the share of
public funding in the OU’s receipts. Other determinants of
organisational efficiency, related to labour and managers’
satisfaction and motivation, are the strength of quality controls and
the nature of the institutions taking care of them (members, users,
users’ organisations, the OU itself, public administration, local
community), the participation to UE projects, the selection
procedure for hiring paid labour (study title, tests, former
experiences in the same sector, former experiences generally,
former experiences in volunteering, personal acquaintance, strong
motivation), the educational attainment of paid labour (we have no
equivalent data for non-paid labour).
Two points about these variables are worth some emphasis:
first, there are some missing values in the data-set for both the S
and the O variables. This means that the samples used in testing
the significance of these variables will be smaller than the baseline
samples of, respectively, 84 and 98 observations. Secondly, the
binary variables representing the institutional nature of the OU are
likely to interact with other proxies of organisational efficiency. As a
consequence, it seems advisable to test the significance of the
institutional dummies before and after the inclusion of other
proxies of organisational efficiency.
Finally, in order to assess empirically the model proposed in
Section 2 we test whether the outputs and the efficiency of non-23
profit OU’s significantly affect two proxies of relational goods: a
(self-assessed) categorical measure of reputation and the number
of cooperation actions with other non-profit OU’s. From our data-
bank we can only retrieve a self-assessment of reputation; while
this has obvious drawbacks, we believe this variable can still be
used to gauge the extent of the trust network shared by the OU. As
for the other proxy, a high number of cooperation actions with
other non-profit OU’s signifies the existence of a wide network of
trust across non-profit organisations, which is likely to extend to
the members of the community.
6. The results
Once partitioned our sample we proceed to the estimation of
regressions for sectors A and B. We only attempt the estimation of
Cobb-Douglas functional forms.
6 Given our number of
observations, most other functional forms would run against a
degrees-of-freedom constraint. The main results, shown in Table
6.1, can be summarised as follows, first for sector A and then for
sector B.
As for sector A, the initial attempts to estimate a production
function met with some problems. In particular, the coefficient on
the (natural log of the) number of beds was insignificant, a highly
unlikely result given the residential nature of the services provided
in this sector. An outlier search, carried out along the lines
expounded in Section 4, led to the detection of two outliers (both
according to the externally studentized residuals for these
observations and to the added variable plots). Once deleted these
observations (their perusal suggested no obvious way in which
they could be corrected), the coefficient on the number of beds
                                                
6 Actually, we estimate hybrid Cobb-Douglas functions. Non-paid labour is often
equal to zero and cannot be logged; however, all the observations for this
variable were divided by their sample mean, so as to yield coefficients
interpretable as elasticities.24
became highly significant. No impact for the institutional nature of
the OU’s was found before or after the deletion of the two outliers.
Then, a specification search was conducted on the S variables,
and only one of them (Duration, the customary duration of the
relationship with the users, which probably singles out OU’s
providing old people care) was found to be significant. The
inclusion of this variable did not imply sizeable difference among
the technical efficiency of non-profit, for-profit, and public
administration units (finer distinctions, between social
cooperatives, religious non-profit, non-religious non-profit, were
never found to be significant).
Then, a specification search was also carried out for the
organisational variables, and we found a highly significant role for
a selection procedure adopted for hiring paid labour (strong
motivation, to be denoted Hiring_7). Not surprisingly, OU’s that
select workers on the basis of their motivation are more efficient
than the other ones. However, more interestingly, as Hiring_7
enters the equation, the binary variable for public administration
increases in size and significance. This means that, controlling for
the hiring procedures, these units are more productive. Since,
without controlling for the hiring procedures, these OU’s are in
average just as productive as the other units, this means that they
choose to hire (or are bound to choose by institutional reasons) not
very highly motivated workers.
The categorical proxy for the Care of Users / Promotion of
Organisation Values was never found to be significant. This lack of
significance makes some sense: if services are provided
residentially, not many extra resources must be put on the care of
users and the promotion of the organisation values among them.
Indeed, we get the opposite results for sector B, to which we now
turn.
Recall that the OU’s in Sector B are not endowed with beds. It
is to some extent surprising, however, that no other input than paid
labour was found to be significant here. Measures of the surface of
buildings, of number of cars and of computers, and above all, of
the amount of non-paid labour, were not significant (to be sure, the
role of non-paid labour in this sector is less important than in
Sector A). It must be surmised that this result reflects an actual
feature of the data, inasmuch as they do not depend on the25
presence of outliers.
7 No anomalous observations could be found,
despite our rather careful search procedure.
Again, we find interactions between the institutional dummies
and other organisational variables. When South, the geographical
location of the unit, and Pluri, the presence of other OU’s in the
same organisation (the only S variables found to be significant)
were included along with labour, no sizeable difference emerged
among the efficiency of non-profit, for-profit, and public
administration units. This changed when the organisational
variables found to be significant through a specification search
were included in the equation: two kinds of selection procedures
for hiring paid labour (Hiring_3: former experiences in the same
sector, and Hiring_6: personal acquaintance); the nature of the
institutions taking care of quality controls (users, in this case -
Quality_2); the educational attainment of paid labour (Education).
OU’s that hire workers because of the past experiences of the
latter, and rely on personal acquaintance with the worker, show
higher productive efficiency. As Education, Quality_2, and, in
particular, Hiring_3 and Hiring_6 enter the equation, the binary
variable of for-profit units jumps up in (absolute) size and
significance. Controlling for these variables, these units are less
productive, meaning that they are better endowed with these
factors, relatively to units belonging to the other institutional
categories. Much as this is an interesting insight on the
comparisons between non-profit and for-profit institutions, we
hasten to add that it only calls for further research on the matter,
as there are only 2 for-profit firms in our sector B. Also note that,
like in sector A, distinguishing between social cooperatives,
religious non-profit, non-religious non-profit never led to significant
results.
Finally, when testing the categorical proxy for the Care of Users
/ Promotion of Organisation Values, we find that this variable is
                                                
7 This statement may not hold true if we could produce a finer partition of the
sample (for instance, cars should matter in the operating units providing home-
care!). Here we run against a data constraint, especially because, at finer
disaggregation levels, the problem of missing values may impinge more heavily
on the design of the sample. In any case, note that communal services, especially
of the kind provided in sector B, are highly labour-intensive.26
significant with the expected negative sign, at least if some control
variables are also included in the equation (South and Pluri
seemed to be the decisive variables in this respect). If services are
not provided residentially, extra resources must be put on the care
of users and the promotion of the organisation values among
them.
Now, in order to test the model given in Section 2, we can
construct for non-profit OU’s some measures of organisational
efficiency as a function of the O variables entering the production
functions. We are talking about Hiring_7 for sector A; Quality_2,
Hiring_3, Hiring_6, Education for sector B. We thought that, within
sector A, Duration is a structural variable unrelated to the units’
behaviour, and should then be excluded from this calculation. For
sector B, it is less clear whether South actually stands for
structural or for organisational factors. However, this is immaterial
for our conclusions, as shall be explained below. In Table 6.2, we
show the estimates obtained for our preferred specifications (the
samples only include non-profit OU’s). We also single out the
variables and parameters utilised in constructing a measure of
efficiency for each observation of both sectors.
In Table 6.3, the measures of organisational efficiency are used
as explanatory variables of our two proxies of the relational goods
produced by the OU’s: the number of cooperation actions with
other non-profit institutions and a categorical variable for the
reputation of the unit. As suggested by our model, we also
consider whether the OU’s outputs, number of users and Care /
Promotion, and an environmental variable, South, have a role in
determining the production of relational goods.
8 Our results show
that the latter is indeed related to efficiency and to Care /
Promotion. Efficiency is more closely related to the number of
cooperation actions, a result supportive of the idea that non-profit
organisations care about organisational efficiency because it leads
to a wider and stronger network of trust. The Care of Users /
Promotion of Organisation Values has also some impact on the
                                                
8 Hence, the eventual presence of South among the determinants of
organisational efficiency does not impinge on the conclusions reached about the
impact of organisational efficiency and Care / Promotion on the production of
relational goods.27
production of relational goods, especially in Sector B. The number
of users is never significant (and is not included in the reported
estimates).
7. Concluding remarks
The evaluation of efficiency for non-profit organisations has
become a high policy priority. From the theoretical standpoint, it
has long been known that the lack in the non-profit sector of a
stakeholder class interested in appropriating the residual from
production is a priori likely to increase the chances of opportunistic
behaviour from the part of workers and managers, raising the
costs of firms in this sector vis-à-vis their for-profit counterparts.
On the other hand, it is widely thought that non-profit organisations
highly care about the network of trust they share with other
members of the community. In this paper, we have provided a
model which relates these relational goods to the productive
efficiency of the organisation.
Relying on a new data-set about Italian for-profit and non-profit
organisations engaged in the provision of communal services, we
have also provided measures of technical and organisational
efficiency and of the link between the latter and the production of
relational goods. Our data-set is particularly interesting because it
surveys organisations involved not only in health-care, but also in
other communal services (including some educational services).
Most of the existing evidence relates to health-care organisations
only.
We find that the technical efficiency of non-profit organisations does
not significantly differ from that of other organisations, and shed some
light about the determination of their performance. The selection
procedures adopted in hiring paid labour seem to play a paramount
role in this respect. No significant role was found for the categories
distinguishing among non-profit organisations (social cooperative,
religious non-profit, non-religious non-profit). Our results also show that28
the production of relational goods (measured by two different proxies)
is indeed related to efficiency and, to a lesser extent, to the promotion
efforts of the operating units. In this sense our results show that, even
in the absence of a stakeholder class interested in appropriating the
residual from production, non-profit organisations do not indulge in
opportunistic behaviour. They also point out a reason of this efficiency-
seeking behaviour on the part of workers and managers.29
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Table 3.1. The Sampled Operating Units by Institutional Category.
Institutional Category n. %
Public Administration 62 23.1
For-profit Organisations 19 7.1
Social Cooperatives 89 33.2
Other Non-religious Non-Profit Organisations 63 23.5
Other Religious Non-Profit Organisations 35 13.1
Table 3.2. Missing Values for the Input and Output Measures.
Variables n. %
Inputs
Number of Paid Workers 9 3.4
Number of Non-Paid Workers 12 4.5
Standard Weekly Hours (Paid Workers) 21 7.8
Standard Weekly Hours (Non-Paid Workers) 41 15.3
Non-Personnel Current Expenditures 126 47.0
Surface of Buildings 76 28.4
Number of Beds 12 4.5
Number of Cars 26 9.7
Number of Computers 23 8.6
Outputs
Number of Service Users 45 16.8
Care of Users / Promotion of Organisation
Values
4 1.533
Table 3.3. Correlations among types of services
Serv1 Serv2 Serv3 Serv4 Serv5 Serv6 Serv7
Serv2 .384
Serv3 -.181 -.218
Serv4 -.126 -.138 .346
Serv5 .050 .116 .262 .433
Serv6 -.135 -.108 .316 .300 .174
Serv7 -.019 -.194 .092 .074 -.075 .145
Serv8 -.200 -.102 .061 .077 -.086 .247 -.069
Table 3.4. Correlations among groups of users
Ut1 Ut2 Ut3 Ut4 Ut5 Ut6 Ut7 Ut8 Ut9 Ut10 Ut11 Ut12 Ut13
Ut2 -0.14
Ut3 -0.19 -0.04
Ut4 -0.09 -0.02 0.56
Ut5 -0.10 0.07 0.29 0.29
Ut6 -0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.33
Ut7 -0.11 0.01 -0.13 -0.08 -0.03 0.02
Ut8 -0.20 -0.07 0.10 0.18 0.08 -0.08 0.06
Ut9 -0.21 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.35
Ut10 -0.11 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.14
Ut11 -0.11 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.21 0.24 -0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.13
Ut12 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.18
Ut13 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.41
Ut14 -0.07 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.19 -0.04 0.13 0.15 0.10
Table 35. Correlations between groups of users and types of services
Serv1 Serv2 Serv3 Serv4 Serv5 Serv6 Serv7 Serv8
Ut8+9+10+12+13 -0.26 -0.29 0.35 0.25 0.12 0.53 -0.02 0.20
Ut3+4+5+6+11+14 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.23 0.07 0.40 0.03
Ut1 0.44 0.54 -0.36 -0.11 0.10 -0.25 -0.27 -0.20
Ut2 0.03 -0.06 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.14 0.09
Ut7 -0.16 -0.20 0.20 0.07 0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.0634
Table 3.6. Correlations between types of services










Table 3.7. Correlations between binary indicators for the presence of beds




Table 3.8. Correlations between input quantities and the provision
of residential services
Residence Beds Paid Work. N. Paid Work.
Beds .877
Paid Workers .183 .165
Non Paid Workers .241 .350 -.176


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 6.2 - Constructing a Measure of Organisational Efficiency for Non-
profit OU’s
Production Functions; dependent variable: number of users




Paid Workers 0.49 4.47








OE_A  =  0.08*Hiring_7
SECTOR A N=46
Care/Promotion -0.65 -3.01
Paid Workers 0.66 7.01

















TABLE 6.3 - Relating Organisational Efficiency to the Production of Relational
Goods
(White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors)
Dependent variable:





Coeff. tratio Coeff. tratio Coeff. tratio Coeff. tratio Coeff. tratio Coeff. tratio
OE_A 12.64 2.17 14.50 2.10 5.18 1.35 6.12 1.53
Care/
Promotion
2.07 1.42 2.62 1.58 1.03 1.04 1.26 1.27
South -1.88 -0.63 -1.45 -0.51 -0.55 -0.21 3.00 3.57 3.22 3.73 3.55 4.63
R-sq. Adj. 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.23 0.22 0.21
SECTOR B
N = 64
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. tratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
OE_B 1.94 1.80 2.15 2.38 1.07 1.26 1.57 2.00
Care/
Promotion
0.48 0.34 0.90 0.70 1.13 1.82 1.37 2.41
South -3.25 -3.81 -3.25 -3.81 -2.90 -3.69 0.79 0.97 0.79 0.97 0.98 1.25
R-sq. Adj. 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.10